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THE

In

LAW

OF

BOUNDARIES.

the early history of the human family,

when man-

kind had riot yet emerged from the darkness of ignorance;
when the scanty inhabitants
the

question of boundary,

led a wandering warlike life;

as affecting the rights

of indi-

viduals, was practically unknown.
In this primative condition, man knew no restraint;
he confined himself to no territory; he recognized no
bounds, save

those which nature had imposed upon him.

To

him, the vast expanse of mother earth, with its wonderful
wealth of undeveloped resources, was as free and common to
all as the air he breathed.
Gradually, however, as man became more civilized, he
abandoned his roving life,
whose limits,

and formed small

settlements,

if defined at all, were marked by natural

boundaries only. Communities,

thus protected, would gerier-

ally coalesce, either by consent or conquest, and thus an
independent State or Kingdom would be
form of government the

formed. Under this

feudal system developed and reached

the height of its power. As property in land became more
valuable, the

question of boundary became more important;

but it was not till the rise of individual ownership in
lands that it became

intimately identified with the rights

of the individual.
To day, in our own country at least, where "every
man is a sovereign", and where the value of larnd in iharly of
our large cities may be estimated by the number of gold
dollars which will be required to cover it, the

question

of boundary becomes one of vital importance, arid one which
effects the property interests of every member of the communi ty.
The term boundary, in its technical sense, may be
defined, as,

"every seperatiori, natural or artificial,

which marks the confines or line of division between two
contiguous estates."(1)

it

ias also been defined,as,"a

legal imaginary line by which different parcels of land

(1)

Bouviers Law Dict.;
Tyler on Bouridaries,

1.

its

are divided". (1) In
to be a line

wider meaning,

or, object indicating

boundary may be said

the limit

or furthest

extent of a State or Territory.
In whatever sense the term is used, the line of
demarkation may be

fluctuating or invisable,

if

the compass

&nd extent of the property can be determined, it will be
sufficient.

Neither is it necessary that the property

should be capab-le of being restrained within artificial
bounds.
Boundaries are naturally divided into two great
classes: natural and artificial.

Natural boundaries are

those which exist

in

them, and include

the sea, rivers and other inland streams,

the condition that nature has made

lakes, ponds, highways, trees, rocks, etc..

Artificial

monuments are such as :re erected or placed upon the land
by man,

as stakes,

feiices,

it is my purpose

etc..
to take up and outline as fully

as my time arid the nature of ir',subject will permit the
law of boundaries appertaining to these subjects.
T H E

(1)

Watson v.

S E A:-

Tilt,

By the civil law the sea shore

14 Barb.,

221.

,like

common to all

mankind,

exclusively to the

and like the sea itself

law of

nations.(I)

gas

subject

By the common law

of England the title to the sea shore and the soil under
the sea was in the crown, and private ownership therein
could only be acquired by grant

from the sovereign . (2)

The common law doctrine has been adopted in
country with little,

if any modification;

this

and as a general

rule a conveyance of land bounded by the sea extends only
to ordinary high water mark. (3) "Usual" or "ordinary high
water mark", has been defined to be the limit reached by
the neap tides,

that is,

those tides which happen between

full and change of moon, twice in every twenty four hours;
(3) or it may be said to be "the

average height of the

water reached by the high tides during the year".
in this country, as in England, corporations or private persons may acquire ownership in the shore or soil
under the sea; but their title must originally be derived
from the State

(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

,

and will always be subject to the inalien-

Institutes, lib. II., tit. 1, p 1-5
Hale's Treatise de Jure Maris, 5-12;
Martin v. Wadell, 16 Pet. (U. S. ) 667.
Wash. Real Prop. Vol. Ill.,
3 Kent's Com. 431;
Van Dolsen v. Mayor of New York, 17 Cent. Law Jour.23l
Teschemacher v. Thompson, 79 Am. Dec., 151.

able right
in

to control

of the State

the waters

be so used as

adjacent

to the same.

to materially

navigation

and regulate
can

Neither
with

interfere

-,he land
of

the right

the public to use the surrounding waters as highways for
commerce.
As early as 1686,

the crown of England granted

to

the corporation of New York the ownership in and controi
over all the lands located around Manhattan Island, situated between high and low water mark.(I)
grant was extended so as to include all

In 1730 this

land under the sea

for a distance of 400 feet from low water mark. (2)

These

early grants have been ratified and confirmed by numerous
legislative enactments since our independence.
By virtue

of the authority vested in

it

(3)
by the State

legislature, the city of New York, through its C.mmon Council,
uals;
ally

has made numerous grants of land to private

individ-

but as the limite of the property conveyed are usuclearly defined in

the instrument

of conveyance,

paratively little litigation has arisen concerning the

(1)
(2)
(3)

Dongan Charter, 1686.
Montgomerie Charter, Jan. 15th,
Laws of 1613, Chapt. 86;
I. N. Y. R. S. 8th Ed., p 633.

1730.

com-

same *
The term "beech", in its legal signification,is synonomous with shore;

and may be defined as, "the land which

is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flux
and reflux of the tides'- (I)

Here agairn the civil law

differs from the comnor

for by the civil law,

law,;

the

shore included the land between low water mark and the
highest winter flood. (2)
While the owner of land bordering on the sea,
cannot properly claim the land below high water mark;

(in

absence of grant from the State) he has, nevertheless, certain rights which are appurtenant

to and pass with the

land, and which may be enjoyed regardless of where the true
boundary line may be. Among these is the right of access
to the water;

the right of accretion;

weed cast upon his land;

the right

.o sea

and in Conn. he has the right to

wharf out if he does no injury to free navigation. (6)
In

Massachusetts and Main,-

'he boundary line of

lands bordering on the sea is low water mark; but this

(1)
(2)
(3)

Hall on the Sea Shore;
Comm. v. Roxbury, 9 Gray 492.
Institutes, lib. II., tit., 1, p 1-5.
Mather v. Chipman, 40 Conn. 382.

departure from the common law is due

to an old colonial

(1) it must be remembered, however, that where

charter.
the shore

is the boundary, !the line of demarkation is not

necessarilly a permanent one

, but is subject to change

as the sea recedes or advances.
N A V I G A B L E

R 1 V E R S

-

in determining

the law of boundaries applicable to navigable rivers, a
question of the utmost difficulty is presented.

This dif-

ficulty arises, riot so much out of the unsettled condition
of the law of boundaries, as from the wide spread and
irreconcilable conflict which has existed in this country
as

to what are technically nagivable rivers.
The rule was well settled at common law that a

navigable river was one in which the tide ebbed and flowed;
and that the boundary line of lands owned by riparian proprietors, bordering upon the same, was high water mark.
By the civil law the test of a navigable river was its
ability to subserve the purposes of navigation.
Many of the States, although regarding all rivers
that were navigable in fact as public highways, made the

(1)

Colonial Ordinance, 1647, Anc. Charter, 148,-k# 2-4;
Dillingham v. Roberts, 75 Me. 469.

ebb and flow of the tide the sole

test for determining

the boundary line of lands bordering on such rivers.
On the other hand a large number of the States
repudiated the common law doctrine, regarding it as unsuitcountry, and

ed to the large fresh water rives of this
adopted the test

of the civil

While it would be

iaw.

impossible to harmonize these rad-

icdlly ditferent doctrines, the following ciaseification,
made with special reference to the law of boundaries, will
be beneficial and may be regarded as embodying substantially the American law upon this subject.
1. The boundary line of lands owned by riparian
proprietors bordering upon rivers in which the tide ebbs
and flows is high water mark.
2. The boundary line of lands bordering upon rivers
in which the tide does riot ebb and flow , but which are
in fact used for the purposes of navigation, depends entirely upon the jurisdiction in which the river is situated
(a) The following States(see note

(I),page 9)in con-

formity with the common law doctrine, hold that the boundary line of landF owned by private
upon such streamE is

individuals, bordering

the filum aquae or thread of the stream.

In a few of the States where

the common law rule

prevails, an exception is made in the case of lands borderinf

,n rivers of such magnitude as the Mississippi

where

it is held that the boundary line is low water mark. (2)
(b) The following States, (see note

(1)

and Ohio

Me.
N. H.
Vt.
Mass.
Conn.
Ohio.
Ill.

Mich.
Mo.
Miss.
N. J.
Md.
S. C.
Ga.

(3))hold that

Browne v. Chadburne, 31 Me. 9;
Robinson v. White, 42 Me. 209;
State v. Boscowen, 28 N. H. 193;
Newton v. Eddy, 23 Vt. 319;
Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257;
Comm. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53;
Bardwell v. Ames, 22 Pick. 333;
Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 68;
June v. Purull, 36 Ohio St. 396;
Seamen v. Smith, 24 111. 523;
Piper v. Connelly, 108 Ill. 646;
But see Trustees v. Schal, 120 Ill. 509;
Backus v. Detroit, 59 Mich. 110;
City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 45 A. L. J.
Primm v. Walker, 38Mo. 99;
Magnolia v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 109;
Atty. Gen. V. R. R. Co. 27 N. J. Eq. 1;
Uoodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348;
State v. Columbia, 27 S. C. 167;
Stanford v. Mangin, 30 Ga. 355;

(2)

Ensiminger v. People, 49 111. 172;
Martin v. Evansville, 32 Ind. 85.

(3)

Pa.

Corson v. Blazer, 2 Birm. 475;
Poor v. Mc Clure, 77 Pa. St. 214;
Iowa. Haughton v. R. R. Co. 47 Iowa 370;
Wisc. Diedrich v. R, R. Co. ,42 Wisc. 248;
Term. Goodern v. Thompsom, 54 Am. Rep. 410;
Fla. Buchit v. Cone, 6 So. Rep. 160;
Ala. Sullivan v. Spotswood, 2 So. Rep. 716;
Kan. Wood v. Flower, 26 Kan. 689.

148;

the boundary line of lands bordering on such streams is
high water mark.

In a few of the States this

question

has never arisen, and in Indiana and Kentucky the courts
have decided both ways. (I)
By the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States,

patents

by the United States of lands bordering on

streams and other waters are to be construed according to
the law of the State in which the land is located. (2)
thereforebecomes

of the utmost

importance

of the narticula- State in which this

it,

to know the la.v

question arises.

In Magnolia v. Marshall(3) this question is learnedly discussed, and the authorities carefully reviewed.
Tiedeman's suggestion in this connection is also
worthv of notice. (4)
Lule in New York:-

The earlier decisions in this

State evinced' a strong tendency to absorb the common law
doctrine as

to navigable rivers in toto;

and as a result,

many absurdities and inconsistencies have been introduced
into the law of boundaries

(1)
(2)
(3)

in

this State.

Dawson v. James, 64 Ind. 162;
Bruce v. Taylor, 2 J. J. Marsh, 160.
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324;
Hardin v. Jordon, 11 Supr. Ct. Rep. 808.
39 Miss. l09.
(4) Tied. Real Prop. #835.

Following these early decisions came a period of
reaction

in which the courts, including some of our most

eminent jurists endeavored to break away from the fallacy
into which the early courts had fallen.

The old common

law, however, had made so deep an impression upon our juris
prudence, that this result was not entirely accomplished;
but many qualifications and restrictions have recently
been made.
The New York rule may be briefly stated, as follows:
1.

All rivers and streams which are capable of

being used for the purposes of navigation are navigable.
2.

The boundary line of lands bordering on such

streams is not determined by the navigability of the stream
but by the ebb and

fiow of the tide.

(a) in all streams in which the tide ebbs and flows,
the boundary line is high water mark.

Title to the bed

ans shore are in the State, subject to the public right of
navigation, over which the Stat- may exercise its aothority
which is
(b)

inalienable.
in

navigable streams

in which, the tide does riot

ebb and flow, the boundary line is the filum aquae or
thread of the stream; but, nevertheless, such streams are

public highways,
public

arid like those of the first

cannot be prevented

from using the

class, (a)

the

same for carry-

ing on trade and comrierce.
The preceding rule aoes riot apply to the Hudson and
Mohawk rivers,

the reason assigned being, that the orig-

inal riparian proprietors took by

grant from Netherlands

where the doctrine of the civil law prevailed.

When the

English acquired control over New York, they o.ly guaranteed to the colonial settlers the same rights and privileges which hd been accorde. them under the soveignty of
Netherlands,

and for

this reason the title to the soil

under these rivers remained in the State.
The courts are disposed to restrict this doctrine to
streams wholly within the State and the above
not a iply t(

the

Niaga-a,

or St Lawrence

rivers,

rule does
though the

tide does not ebb and flow in these waters.
The following are the principal New York cases
vihich have arisen involvinE this question. (I)

(1)

People v. Platt, 17 John. 195; Hooker v. Cummings,
20 John. 0,0;
Roger v. Jones, 5 Wend. 237;
Conrs. v.
Kempshall, 26 'end 404;
Ex Parte Jennings, 6 Cowen 518;
Gould v. H. R. R. R. Co. 6N. Y. 522;
People v. Canals
Apprs., 33 N. Y. 461;
Trustees v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56;
Smith v. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463;
Bedlow v. Dock Co.,
112 N. Y. 263;
83 N. Y. 178;
19N. Y.523; 110 N. Y. 680.

N 0 N-N A V I

G A B L E

S T R E A M S :-

Non-navi-

gable streams may properly be defined as,"those which are
not used or susceptable of being used in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which

trade and

travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade or travel on the water".(I)
The rule
uniform,;
streams is

in regard to such streams is entirely

and the boundary line of lands
the filum aquae or

term filum aquae

bordering on such

thread of the stream.

The

is defined by Washburne as,"the middle

line between the shores, irrespective of the depth of the
channel, taking it in the natural and ordinary stage of
the water, at its medium height, neither swollen by freshets or shrunk by droughts'.(2)
L A K E S

A N D

P 0 N D S :-

Here, as in fresh

water navigable streams, we are met with much conflict of
authority,

had the various States followed logically the

rule adopted by them in

regard to rivers

and other strears,

adhering either to the rule of the common law or to the
civil law doctrine, little difficulty would be experienced

(1)
(2)

The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557;
The Genesee Cheif, 12 How. 454.
Wash. Real Prop. Vol. 111., Chapt. II.,

# 4

in

determining the boundary

lakes and ponds.

line of lands bordering on

That suclb a course has not been taken

by the different States, is very evident from a careful
study of the various authorities.
In

mosr of the Eastern States where

the common law

doctrine regarding boundaries upon fresh water streams
was implicitly followed, the common law rule concerning
lakes and ponds has been entirely disregarded.

in these

States the courts hold that grants of land bordering upom
lakes and ponds extend only to low water mark. (I)
The reason for this radical departure from the common law has been partly due to an early colonial ordinance
which provided that the title to all lakes and ponds containing more than ten acres should be in the State. (2)
Other States though not passing statutes upon this subject
followed the lead of Massachusetts by judicial decisions
promulgating the same rule. (3)
On the other hand we find many of the States holding that the title to the soil under lakew and ponds is

(I)

(3)

Mass.
Me.
N. H.
Vt.
Angel

Paine V. Woods, 108 Mass. 160;
(2)Anc. Ch. 1647.
Robinson V. White, 42 Me. 209;
State V. Company, 49 N. H. 240;
Austin V. R. R. Co.,45 Vt. 218;
on W. C. # 41;
Wash. Reap Prop. Vol. Il1.
443.

in the riparian proprietors, and that the center of the
same is the boundary line.
Though this construction has been much criticized
and is subject to many and valid objections, it has recent4
ly been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(I) and may be regarded as settled law in Ohio, New Jersey
and Illinois;

(2) while in Michigan arid Indiana this rule

has been adopted with slight modification. (3)
The great difficulty in the practical application of
this rule is,

that in lakes and ponds there is ordinarily

no filum aq.ae, and where the body of water is irregular in
outline and more or less circular in form, it is almost
impossible to locate definately the dividing line between
different riparian proprietors owning land bordering on
such water. (4)
The rule in New York was apparently well settled
until the decision of Smith v. Rochester; (5) but it appears

(1)
(2)

Hardin v. Jordon, 11 Supr. Ct. Rep. 808.
Lambeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 248;
Cobb v. Davenport, 33N. J. L. 223;

(3)

Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48;
Ridgeway v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248.

(4)
(5)

Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rep. 309.
92 N. Y. 466.

from the holding in this case that New York is now placed
The question of boundary was

among the doubtful States.

not directly involved in this case;

nevertheless, the court

admittedly unsupported by any precedent and entirely ignoring the case of Wheeler v. Spinola, (1) held that the title
proprietors bordering upon

to lands owned by riparian

inland lakes and ponds extends

to the center of the same.

The decesion in this case, however, has been recently commented upon by the Supreme Court

of this State,in

the case of Gouverneur v. Nat. Ice Co.,

(2) where the

"The case of Smith v. Rochester depended upon

court said:-

questions and considerations riot involved in Wheel-

so many

er v. Spinola, and this latter case was not referred to,
the inference, is

that the

court did riot intend to make any

departure from the law as there laid down."
If

a

similar construction is

placed upon this

case

by the higher courts, as seems very propable, Wheeler v.
Spinola and earlier decisions may stilL be regarded as
sound law in

this State.

(3)

In the case of artificial lakes and ponds a differV

(1)

54 N. Y.

(2)

1

(3)

N. Y. Supp.,

87.

ent rule prevails, arid in absence of a clearly expressed
intent to the contrary, a conveyance of land bounded upon
an artificial

body of water will extend to the

the same.(1)

In regard to our large inland lakeq

center of
the

courts (f the different States are entirely uniform in
holding, that in the absence of grant from the State, private ownership

of land under such bodies of water cannot

exist.The reason for this is obvious:

it would be incom-

patible witn the dignity of the State to relinguish the
control over waters which are properly international, and
in which ownership by private individuals would prove
rather detrimental than otherwise.
H I G H W A Y S ;-

It may be regarded as an almost

universal rule of law, that in the absence of express stipulation or

clear intent to the contrary, a grant of land

bounded by a public highway extends to the center of the
same. (2)This presumption is allowed to prevail on the
theory that when the road was originally builtthe proprietors on either side each contributed a portion of his laid
for this purpose.
(I)
(2)

D

This rule is also supported by a sound

Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y.
Helmer v. Castle, 109 Ill. 664;
Transue v. Sell, 105 Pa. St. 684;
Pech v. Denniston, 121 Mass. 17;
Dunham v. Williams, 37 N. Y. 251; 128 N. Y. 253.

public policy

which discourages the inconvenience and

impropriety of having so small and narrow a strip of land
the subject of distinct and seperate ownership.
This rule is riot only applicable to country thorough
fares, but it applies with equal force to the streets of
most of our cities.(I)

An exception to this rule, however,

is found in conveyances bounding upon the streets of New
York. By laws of 1873 the municipal corporation, the city
of New York, became the owner of all lands included in

the

streets of N. Y..(2) For this reason grants of land bounding upon the streets of New York City extend only to the
edge or boundary line of the street. Such will also be
the rule in regard t(

tn ordinary highway when the lang-

uage of the conveyance clearly indicates
of the highway

vas intended.

that a reservation

But whst language will

be suf

ficient tC

3stablish such intent is the point of difficulty

upon which

the courts have differed. In some courts a

rather strict construction is placed upon the
grant, and in others a liberal one is allowed.

(1)

(2)

terms of the
It is

Sherman v. Mc Keonr, 38 N. Y. 266;
Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens,87 N. Y. 287;
Sterry v. h1L" R. R. Co., 122 N. Y.
People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188.

impossible to lay down any technical rule which will adopt
itself to every case that may arise;

and each case must

be governed largely by the particulal circumstances that
surround it.
Other general rules of construction,relating to
boundaries upon highways, will be spoken of in connection
with another subject.
T R E E S ,

R 0 C K S , E T C.:-

Trees are nat-

ural monuments, easily marked and identified, and are,
therefore mcch used for indicating the boundary line between adjacent proprietors.

In absence of express words

to the contrary, the center of the
dividing line;

tree is regarded as the

and a description extending to a specified

tree carries title to the center of the same.

IN such a

case the adjacent proprietors are tenants in common of
the tree;

and neither can destroy the same withoutthe

consent of the oyher.(I)
If, however, the clear intention of the parties
seems to be that the dividing line shall be wholly on one
side of the tree, as where the deed calls for certain lands

- -- -- -- -------------------(1)

Hoofman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201;
Dubtis v. Beaver, 25 N. Y. 123;

extending only to the North side of a certain tree, the
intent will govern; (I) and in such a case the party on
whose land the tree stands is entitled to arty fruit which
may grow thereon, and cannot be prevented from gathering
the same, though the branches project over the land, and th
roots extend into the soil of another.

According to the

old authorities, the adjacent owner may lop off such roots
or branches, though the tree is thereby injured or destroy
ed. (2)

But the better rule is for the aggrieved party

to bring an action for nuisance, and thus compel the removal of the same. (3)
In the case of rocks, etc

.,

the general rules

which have alrealy been given apply, and no further discussion of these subjects will, therefore, be necessary.
A R T I F I C 1 A L

M 0 N U M E N T S : Artificial

monuments are those which are erected by man and placed
upon the land to indicate the line of demarkation between
two adjoining estates.

They are generally of a

less

permanent character than natural monuments, and can be

(1)
(2)
(3)

Stewart v. Patrick, 68 N. Y. 450;
Wash. Real Prop. Vol. I.? p 11-12;
Arken v. ketchum, 39 Barb. 400;
Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 118;
Davis v. Williams, 16 Qpeens Bench, 556.

more easily removed or destroyed.

For this reason they are

riot regarded as of so high authority in mnrking boundaries
as natural

monuments.

Artificial monuments may consist of stones, stakes,
fences, or any object or mark which serves to point out or
designate the boundary line.

They are usually made at the

time of the original survey, but may be made at any time
subsequent. if

made under proper authirity or by the con-

sent of the interested parties.
Stakes,

stones and other similar objects,

ployed very extensively by government surveyors

are ema7
to aid

in locating the boundary line between different tracts of
land. The size, shape and kind of monuments to be used,
are prescribed by the government;

and a person familiar

with surveying can readily determine the location and relative position of different tracts of land by examining
such artificial monuments.
"Fences",

says Taylor, "are

sometimes defined

boundariesfor the division of property, but they are more
properly treated in law as guards against intrusion."

(I)

Tyler

on Boundaries,

(1)

While this is true,

it is also true that fences are very

generally used to indicate the boundary line between different estate$,and that if the location of a division
fence

acquiesced

is

in

for a

sufficient

length of time

it becomes birging upon the parties and serves to establish the division line in conformity with the location of
such fence.
At common law one must build a division,or line
fence as

it is usually called, to restrain his ca-tle from

encroaching or trespassing upon the land of an adjoining
proprietor;

but he need riot in any case fence against

intrusion from the cattle of another.
The rule of the common law has been adopted in this
country, only so far as it is applicable to our different
condition of society, arid the greater extent of our territory.

In many of the States statutes have been passed reg-

lating this subject.

In New York provisions are a so

made for the settlement of disputes between adjoiring land
owners, concerning their division fences, by submitting
such disputes to a special tribunal, krosn as Fence Viewers.

Fence Viewers are also authorized to provide

proper erection and maintainance

of line fences,

for the

and to see

that the

terms and conditions

are

imposed by the statutes

properly complied with. (I)
BOUNDARI

ES

DETERMI

HOW

NED

-

Originally, the title to most land in this country was acquired, either by grant from the sovereign, or by purchase or conquest from the Indians.
day were more or less imperfect;

the

terms used in

vague and uncertain.

and the line of demark-

estates was somewhat indefinate.

ation between different
So to,

Surveys at this early

the instrument of conveyance were

As the number of inhabitants

land became more valuable;

increased

and the large tracts were grad-

ually broken up into smaller ones, whose bourdaries were
more correctly determined.
Agreements concerning boundaries were usually reduced to writing, and incorporated irnto the deed or instrument of conveyance.

If the s ame property was subsequently

conveyed,similar descriptions were employed, or reference
was made to

the original deed or survey.

In this manner

the language used in the deed describing the premises

con-

veyed, became one of the principal means of ascertaining

(I)

the boundary line between different estates
When the language employed in

the instrument of con-

veyance is clear and unequivical, little difficulty will be
experienced in arriving at the intention of the parties;but
where the language used is uncertain, ambiguous, or inconsistent, the courts will frequently be called upon to render assistance

in

interpreting the meaning of the language

used.
To accomplish this result certain well recognized
principles or rules of construction have been adopted by
the courts.

Among the rules which are more particularly

applicable to the law of boundaries, are the

1.

following:-

Monuments control courses and distances, arid,

likewise, all

other measurements.(I)

The reason for this

rule is obvious.

Courses and distances are merely descript-

ive of the facts;

while monuments are actual visable object

indicating the extent of the land and thE
boundary lines.

direction of its

The accuracy of the first depends upon the

skill of the surveyo', and the condition of his instruments
while

(I)

in the case of monuments, there is no opportunity

Beal v. Gordon, 55Me 482;
Morrse v. Rogers, 118 Mass. 572;
Piper v. Connelly, 109 Ill. 646.

for variance, as they always extend in the same direction,
and are always the same distance from each other.
Among monuments, natural ones takes preference over
Artificial monuments may or 4iay not be in

artificial ones.

existence at the time of the transfer; but if they are sibsequently erected and agreed upon by the parties, they will
be binding and will ordinarilly control courses and distances. (I)
Though the general rule is as stated,
inflexable

one,and

calls

it is not an

for monuments which are repugnant

to the whole description, will be rejected.

(2)Thus where

metes arid bounds are represented by visable marked lines,
they cannot be extended, though monuments are called

for

beyond. (3)
2.
ces

In the absence of monuments, courses and distan-

control.

(4) As between courses and distances, courses

usually prevaili

though regard must always be had for the

intention of the parties.

(I)
(2)

(3)
(4)

If the boundary line is described

Corning v. Troy Co., 40 N. Y. 208;
Hathaway v. Evans, 108 Mass., 270.
Swift v. Lee, 65 ILL. 336;
White v. lunnim,
93 U. S. 515;
Higginbotham v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y. 94.
Tyler on Bounds.
R. R. Co. v. Dyrer, 49 Vt. 74;
Drew v. Swift, 46 N.Y.
Wilson v. Hildrith, 118 Mass., 578.

as extending from one natural object to another,

or from

a given point to a natural moriument, as a highway or river,
a straight line is meant;

and in the latter case, the boun-

dary line will always extend at right angles to the stream
or highway at the point of its intersection with the same.

(I)
3.

Quantity is the least certain af any call. Even

though the words "no more" are used after the number of
acres specified in the deed, this will not be sufficient
to control calls for monuments clearly defined and indicated,

(2) Quantity, therefore,

is only useful where no

other calls are given, or if given, where they cannot be
ascertained.
The above general rules of construction might be
supplemented
ones;

by an almost unlimited number of particular

but as the subject of construction is not properly

a part of my theme, I will only refer to a few of the

most

prominent.
When the

term bank, side, margin, edge or shore is

useo,in describing a conveyance of land bounding upon a

(I) Van Gorden v. Jackson, 5 Johns. 474;
Bradley v. Vilson, 58 Me. 360.
(2) Thayer V Finton, 108 N. Y. 324;
Collinrwood v. Parr, 93 Ill. 231.

river or other stream of water,the courts have gene ally
held that no part of the bed of such stream passes to the
grantee; but that the boundary line will be high or low
water mark, accordingly as the river is navigable or nonrinvigable.(I)

So the word side, margin, or edge have been

held to exclude the street;

thus a description beginning

at a point on the South side of a road,.....thence along
the same, will not include any

part of the road. (2)

Ordinarily , land described as extending in a certain direction up, or down a river will be held to extend
to the center of the river;but where the stream is small,
as an ordinary brook, the courses will control rather than
the line of the stream. (3)
THe terms "to

the river",

river", or"along the river", are

"by the river",

"with

the

frequently used in de-

scribing land, and in absence of clear intent to the contrary,

the

filum aquae or thread of the stream will be

regarded as the boundary line.(4)

(I)

(2)
(3)

But where a creek was

19; (4) Vanburen v. Baker,
Rockwell v. Baldwin, 53111.
12 N. Y. S. R. 209;
Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9;
Wash. R. Prop.
Halsey v. Mc Cormick, 13 N. Y. 296;

Tyler on Bounds.
Sibley v- Holden, 10 Pick.,249;
Seneca v. Knight, 23 N. Y. 498.
Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevdns, 87 N. Y. 287.
Winthrop v. 6urtis, 3 Greenl. 110.

bounded on the West side by a creek with high and precipitous sides, it was held that the description did not
include any part of the water , or the right to use the

same. (I)
"By or along the beech", includes the land only to
high water mark. (2)
The words to,

from,or by,and other words of sim-

ilar import, in their ordinary signification, are words of
exclusion;

but as may be seen by the above ezamples, the

nature of the subject matter may be such thatby necessary
or usual implication, a different construction will be
placed upon them.
The following rale,formulated in an early Massachusetts case,

is unboubtedly the best One that can be given

upon this subject; and will be of material assistance in
this connection:-

"Whenever land is described as bounded by

other land, or by a building or structure, the name of
which, accotding to its legal and ordinary meaning,includes
the title in the land in which it has been made a part,

(I)
(2)

Hall v. Water
eo., 103 N. Y. 129.
Trustees of East Hampton v. Kirk, 68 N. i.

z59.

as a house, a wall, a wharf, the side of

the structure

referred to as the boundary is the limit of the grant; but
where the boundary line

is simply by an object,

.hether

natural or artificial, the name of which is used in ordinary speech as defining a boundary, and not as describing a
title in fee, and which does not in its nature

or descript

ion include the earth as far down as the grantee owns ,
and yet which has width, as a

the case of a way, a river,

a ditch, a wall, a tree or stake,

the center of the thing

so running over or standing on the land isthe line

of

boundary of the lot granted. " (I)
S U R V E Y S :-

Surveys are in many instances

the original means whereby th. boimdary line between different estatesis deeinate~y located;

and they are not

ly referred to in the instrument of conveyance.

Under our

present Public Land System, surveys are indispensible, and
a knowledge of the general principles which govern the
same is necessary to the successful practicioner in many
of the States of this country.

As this subject is so

intimately connected with the law of boundaries as to be
almost inseperable from it,

--

I will briefly state the

---------------------

- - --

general method upon which government surveys are conducted.
The first step is to determine the initial point,
or place of beginning.

This is usually located at some

central point, from which observations can be conducted
most advantageously.

After the initial point is deter-

mined, lies are run East and Weat and marked at each half mile
with a quarter section corner, and at each mile with a
section corner.

The line passing through the initial point

is then extended North and South, and lines, called standard parallels, are run parallel with the same.

These lines

vary in distance from each other according to the latit-de.
In the northern States they are usually either twenty four
miles apart or some multiple of twenty four; and in the
States farther South some multiple of thirty is generally
used.

Other lines are then run East and West six miles

apart; and aleo North and South a like distance from each
other.

The area included betweem the intersection of

these adjacent lines is called a township.

Townships are

numbered North and South from the principal base.

A series

or tier of townships is called a range. These are numbered
East and West from the principal meridian; the first tier
of townships East being range one East, and the first tier

of townships West being rantre one West, etc.

Townships

are divided into sections, and these in turn are subdivided
into half and qiarter sections.

The location of any par-

ticular tract of land is indicated by referring to the different points of the compass.

These surveys are of mater-

ial assistance, and little difficulty will be experienced
in ascertaining the tf~ue boundary line between different
tracts of land located within the territory where they have
been made.
Where a plat or survey is referred to in a deed,
it may be properly regarded as a part of the description,
and construed in connection with the whole in3trument.
Maps are usually the results of surveys and are
governed by the same rules .

In both the case of maps and

surveys it must clearly appear that they have been made
under competent authority, and have been taken from the
prpper costody.
P R A C T I C A L

L 0 C A T 1 0 N

Disputes

between adjoining owners concerning the practical location
of their boundary lines, have been the source of much litigation in recent yeurs.

It is, however, well settled by

the weight of authority that only in cases where the

boundary line is actually uncertain and subject to dispute,
will a practical location of the same control unless acquiesced in for more than twenty years, or mutually agreed
upon by the parties.

The rule upon this subject has been

thus concisely stated : (I) "Where the description of the
premises ina deed is deflnate,certain and unambiguous, no
extrinsic ecidence is admissible to show a different location, unless possession be shown under claim of title for
such a length of time as to bar a recovery in ejectment.
If, however, the description is vague, obscure or ambiguous, or the monuments refei-red to have become decayed or
destroyvd, such evidence is admissible in aid of the deed!
Practical location of the boundary line may be inferred by
agreement, by long acquiescence, oi- by acts and declarations of the parties.
A G R E E M E N T :-

Here, also, the true locatior.

of the boundary line must be unknown, or at least uncertain, in order that a valid agreement concerning the same
may be made and enforced.

There has been much controversy

among the coutts of different jurisdictions as to whether
such an agreement respecting disputed boundaries were withA
the statute of frauds; but the better and generally prevail

ing Lule seems to be zhac they are nor.

"To biing an agree

ment in respect to lands under the statute of fr-uds, it
must in effevt create, grant or assign, surrender or declar
some interest or estate in lands other than a lease for a
term of one yeaftlis claimed that such an agreement does
not effeut the title to the land, but merely defines -nd
determines the line of seperation between two estates.

nn

the other hand itis asserted that unless the true division
line is decided upon, some portion of one partt's land will
in eff-ct be conv-yed to another.

This is true, but by

allowing the presumption that the line agreed upon is the
true one, this difficulty will be disposed of.

7urther

this rule seems to be supportrd by a sound public policy
which tends to encourage the settleni;ent of such disputes
by friendly means, rather than by resorting to the courts.

(I)
An oral agreement to change a boundary line which
has been established for more than twenty years, is not
in itself sufficient to change the possession, and may be
revoked at any time before the boundary line is removed.(2)

fI)
(2)

Fosburg v. Teater, 32 N. Y. 561.
Dunham v. Stuyvesant, 11 Johns 569.

Such an agreement made under a mistake of facts is not biniing, if promptly rescinded upon discovering such mistake.
(T)

Tt

has aso been held that if the line fixed upon by

agreement can be shown not to be the true line, it will
not be birding unless acquiesced in for twenty years. (2)
This maY y rhaps be regarded as extreme doctrine, and somewhat questionable law in a few of the States; but notwithstanding this fact, if the mistake was originally due to
the fault of the surveyor, agreements concerning such errc4e
eous boundary ;ine will not be enforcible.

The doctrine

of estoppel is frequently involved in cases 6f this nature,
and is by no means an insignifigant element in settling
disputed boundary lines.

A party though not entering into

any express agreement concerning the boundary line may ye:
be estopped from denying that the existing line is the true
one, if by his acts or omissions he has lead the other
party to

act or to refrain from acting to his detriment.

Thus if a party knowing where the true boundary line is,
permits the adjoining owner to clear up and improve his
land beyond this line, or otherwise make costly improve--------------------------

(I
(2)

---------

Coon v. Smith, 29 N. Y. 362.
Liverpool Wharf Co. v. Prescott, 7 Allen 494.

ments under a mistaken impression as to the true location
not
be allowed to show
wil]thereafter
he
line,
of the boundary
that it is elsewhere.

So in cases of fraud or misrepre-

sentation , where the other party has been led thereby to
incur expense, the same rule applies.

But where both par-

ties are equally innocent, neither will be estopyed

Lrom

claiming to the true buuiidary line, though the other has
erected a division fence in the wrong place and made improvements up to the same.(I)

Neither will mere silent

acquiescence, in absence

knowledge as to the true

of

location of the boundary line, be sufficient to preclude a
party from maintaining an action of ejectmdnt to oust a
party who has been in possession of land beyond the true
line, and who claims by virtue of a division fence which
both parties knew to be in existence.
A D V E R S E

P 0 S S E S S I 0 N

-

A division

fence which has been maintained in one place continuously
for a period of twenty years becomes binding upon the parties, and no evidence will be allowed to be introduced
showing that the line is elsewhere.

This is true, in the

case of adjoining proprietors, though the possession is

(I)

Raynor v. Timerson, 54 N. Y 639;
Schraeder Mining & Mfg. Co., v. Packer, 129 U. S. 659.

not of such a nature as to constitute technical adverse
possession.

Thus mere silent acquiescence in the location

of a boundary line for twenty ye-rs is sufficient to bar
a recovery. (I)
The necessary elements to constitute adverse possess
ion proper are well understood and need n(.t here be mentioned.

7he general rules applicable to adverse possession

proper also apply to boundaries, unless they have been
superseded by special statutory provisions. (2)
A C T I 0 11 S

A T

L A t :-

In absence of statutes
I

regulating the method of procedure, the usual way of settling disputed boundaries is by an action of ejectment to
determine the title to the land in dispute.

It can hardly

be regarded as action to settle the true boundary line,
though this result follows as incidental to the determination of the main issue.

The judgement must set out the

land in dispute by metes and bounds, and thus the disputed
boundary line is definitely settled.
(ac t i on
Another method of reaching the sane result is by an
for trespass.

This action is seldom resorted to at the pres-

ent time, owing to the more expeditious method which has

{I)
(2)

Fisher v. Bennehoff,121 Ill. 426.
Code Civ. Pro.,
# 37C -372.

superseded it under our modern practice.
E Q U I T Y :-

I N

In the case of boundaries, aL

in other subject matter over which equity exercises jurisdiction, the basis on which the court takes cognizance is
the inadequacy of the legal remedy; and it

is

a well estab-

lished rule that there must be some equity existing bet.een
the immediate parties to the action.

Ordinarily this must

arise out of something other than a me e dispute in regard

to 1ho location of the boundary line.
In

the case of Perry v.

"The right to

Pratt(I)

the court said:-

issue a commission to ascertain boundaries

is necessarily limited by the rule that equity will not
interfere wheye there is an adequate remedy at law.

It is,

theref -'e, confined to cases whey-e there is so:e peculiar
equit,
bounds,

Attached to the controversy respecting the lost
arising out of the fr~u Aulent or negligent mis-

conduct of the respondait; where it is his duty to preserve
the boundaries and they cannot otherwise be found or restored; to cases where a resort to eqaity is necessorv
prevent a multiplicity
power is necessarily

of suits; and to cases where the
nercised incidentally in the fyu'-

thance of another equity."

(i)

31 Caiu.

433.

to

So it has been held that the

question of title must be involved or equity will not
assume jurisdiction.

So in boundary cases in which the

plaintiff is entitlec

.o an injunction, the court of equity

will gixs relief.

Thus where the defrndant threatened t(
house,

to take down and remove a part of plaintiff's

whichi

he claimed extendedover upon his premises ; and it was
claimed that the damage resulting would be irreparable at
and granted an injunction

law, equity assumed jurisdiction

and thereafter a cnmission was appointed to ascertain and
settle the disputed boundaries.(I)

So, also, in the case

of landlord and tenant, the court of equity will frequently
take cognizance of the case and adjust the peculiar equites
arising between the parties.
E V I D E N C E :sibility

The rules relating to the admis-

of evidence in boundary cases aremuch more liberal

than in ordinary cases.

As a general rule it may be said

that "every kind of evidence which is admissible to esta'tlish a_,_ other fact is admissible to prove or establish a
boundary ;ine."
The instrument of conveyance, if any, is the primary
source from which a knowledge of the boundary line is to be
ascertained; and im this as in other written instruments

(ii

De Veney v.

Gallager,

20 N.

3.

Eq.

33.

no evidence will be admitted to change or vary the terms
therein contained.

But parol evidence is admissible for

the purpose of expliining and removing latent ambiguities.
Thus, where monuments are referred to in a deed, evidence
may be given to show their

location, and in the case of

calls for different monuments, to show which one is intended.

So parol evidence may be given to explain the meaning

of technical, or unusual terms; but no evidence can be
given to show a different intention from that clearly
expressed in the instrument of conveyance. Parol evidence
is also admissible to show the location of a boundary line
as established by agreement between adjoining land owners.

Where the record of a survey is referred to, evidence may be Liven to explain the meaning of

.Les and

marks appearin, in the same; but only the party who made or
participated in the original survey is competent to testify
to the same. So public maps of recognized authority, which
are under proper custody, are admissible; but private maps
and surveys, as a general ruleare not.

As in the case of

surveys, maps referred to in a deed, are regarded as a part
(I)

-

-

----------------------

Shutz v. Sweeney, 26 N. R. (Ill.) 648.

- - --

of the deed and are entitled to equal weight.

In the case

of a discrepancy between a ma) and a survey, the latter
will control. (I)
At conmon law declarations ziere not admissible, oven
in boundary cases, unless they were part of the res gestae;
and this is still the rule in mnany of the States.

Accord-

ing to these authorities, such declarations must be made
by persons since deceased, while in the act of pointing
out the boundary line, and while in actual possession of
the land.(2)

Some States, however, hold that such decla-

rations need not be made while in the act of pointing out
the boundary line.(3)

Neither is it necessary in some

States that the declarant should have been in possession at
the time.
In the case of ancient deeds, avidence as to the
usage in recent times is admissible when the lapse of time
has been so great as to render it

difficult to prove a

boundary line by the existence of postive evidence.

So

evidence may be given showing a general custom or imnemorial usage .

-

(I)
(2)

(3)

This is more frequently resorted to in England

--------------------- -----------------Whiting v. Gardener, 22 Pac. 71.
Lang v. Colton, 114 Mass. 414;
Bartlett v , Emerson, 7 Gray 144;
Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 365.
Powers v. Silsby, 41 Vt. 288.

thani in America; but in matters of of general ur public
nature, as boundaries of counties, rights of common, public
highways, etc., evidence of this nature may be given in
most of the States of this country.
The general rule is undoubted that conon reputation is admissible as evidence in in questions of boundary;
but there is much diversity as to its proper application.
(I)

In a recent Texas case this subject was very ably

discussed, and I cannot do better than to quote from the
opinion of the learned Judge;- "The unrestricted admission
of this species of evidence would be fraught with the most
dangerous tendencies, and violate the best dictates of
experience.

The admissibility, as well as the value and

weight ,of general reputation depand

'ery much upon the cir-

cumstances of the case in which it is offered. It cannot
of course be received as to title.

It is admissible only

as to the loquo in quo of the boundary, a fact of which
the community and neighborhood around it is supposed to be
peculiarly well informd.

The boundary must be an ancient

one; and its supposed locality must be of sufficient interest or note in the neighborhood or coinmunity to have been
-

- - -

-

- - - - - ---

(I) Boardman v. Trustees of Reed, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 340

the subject of observation and conversation among the people.

The reputation or understanding must be general and

concurrent. There, weight of opinion or neighborhood report
is not coimnon reputation.

The reputation or understanding

must have been formed and in existence before the controver
sy commenced in which it is used as evidence."(I

ALLUVIO

N.

Alluvion, or increase per projectionem vel alluvionem, may be defined as :- "The gradual accumulation of
alluvial deposits upon the bank of a river or the shore of
the sea'.

A knowledge of the rules governing this subject

is almost indispensible, owing to the important bearing
which it has in determining the boundaries of land borddring upon the water.

If the

accumulations are gradual,

the boundary line of lands bordering on such water changes
with the increase of alluvial deposits.
Courses, says:to

Angel on Water

(I) 9When the change is so gradual as not

be perceived at any one moment of time, the proprie-

tor, whose land is thus increased, is entitled to the addition.' (2) The test as

to what is gradual and imperceptible

Tucker V. Smith,(Feb. 1887)
(la) Ang. Water Courses, # 53,
(2) Halsey v. Mc Cormick, 18 N. Y. 149;
New Orleans v. U. S.,lO Pet. 662.
fI)

in the sense of the rule is, that "though the winnesses
may see from time to time that progress has been made,
they cannot preceive it while the process is going on'.
Various rules for determining the boundary line

(I)
of

land formed by accretion have been laid down by the courts
of this country,; but it is impossible to formulate any sin
gle rule which will apply to every particular case" The
oldest and perhaps the most widely accepted rule was derivd
from the civil law, and was first recognized in this
countryin the case of Deerfield v. Arms, (2) and has since
been followed in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York,
Louisiana and the Supreme court of the United States.(2)
The rule is thus stated:-

"Measure the whole extent of the

different riparian proprietors line on the river, and
ascertain how many feet each proprietor owned on this line;
divide the newly formed river line into equal parts and
appropriate to each proprietor as many of these parts as
he owned feet on the old line; and then draw lines from the
points at which the pr~prietors respectively bounded on the
oldto the points thus determined as the points of division

fI)
f2)
(3)

---------------------------------------Co. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. (U. S) 46.
17 Pick. 41.
Batchelder v. Kiniston, 51 N. H. 496;
O'Donnell v. Kelsey, 10 N. Y. 412;
Banks v. Odgen, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 57;
Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. (U. S.) 150.

on the newly formed shore.'

The following rule has also

been recognized in some jurisdictions:-

"Draw a line along

the main charniel, in the direction of the general course of
the current in front of the two estates, and from a line

so drawn, and at right angles with it, draw a line to meet
the original division line on the shore.'(I)

In Maine a

rule differing from those above given has been adopted;

but it has been found to be of little practical importance
owing to the great difficulty expirienced in the application.

In Michigan the rule laid down in the early Massa-

chusetts case has been adopted with some modifications. In
a recent case in that State, the the court said:freely admitted that this rule

OIt is

may require modifications

under particular circumstances in order to secure equal
justice, and that, in ascertaining the shore line or margin of the water, a general line ought to be taken, and
not the actual length of the line on the margin, if it
happens to be elongated by deep indentations or sharp projections, so that the line shall embrace the genaral line
of the shore.'

(2)

Whether the same rule applies to a~lu' - ion formed by
artificial means is not so clear from the aut orities.

(-I)Stockman v. Browning, 1811. J. Eq. 391.
(2)Lumber Co. v. peters, 87 Mich. 498.

There is a dictum in Halsey v. Mc Cormick(I)which would
indicate that it does; certainly

as against the party

causing such erosion and consequent accretion.

This law

is al so applicable to lands upon an artificial pond.

It

must be remembered, however, that this rule is not an arbitary one; and that if from a fair interpretation of the
language used in the instrument of conveyance the intention
of the parties seems to be to locate the boundary line
definitely,

it will remain p ermanent and unchangeable

though alluvial deposits are subsequently formed. (2)
Reliction may be defined as, Oland left uncovered
by the receding of the water from its former condition', If
the water recedes gradually and insensibly, the land thus
exposed belongs to the adjacent owner; but if the increase
be sudden the land stillbelongs to its former owner,
State

the

or the adjacent riparian proprietor, accordingly as

the rule of the civil or common law prevails, subject of
course to the modifications already mentionede(II)
Avulsion is, "where by the immediate and manifest
power of the stream soil is taken suddenly from one man's

(I)

18 N. Y. 147.

f2) Cook v. Mc Clure, 58 N. Y. 457.
(II) Land Co. v. Lippincott, 45 N. J. L. 409.

land and carried to anotherso"(I)

If the annexation is

caused by some sudden convulsion of nature the result will
the same*

In either case the land so removed belongs to

the original owners and no change in the boundary line will
take place.

But according to the old rule, the original

owner must not

allow such soil to remain uFon the adja-

cent proprietor, until it cemented or coalesced with the
soiL

of the s4cond owner, or else his right to reclaim it

would be lost.

ISLANDS.
After having mastered the general principles

alread

enunciated, relating to boundaries in general, their application to islands will occasion comparitively little difficulty. In those States which have accepted the common law
doctrine as to navigable rivers in full, the following
rules are applicable:ers belong to the State.

Islands formed in navig able rivIslands formed in non- navigable

rivers belong to the riparian proprietor.

If such island

form in the center of the stream, the filum aquae or thread
of the stream remains the boundary line.

Hence, if

such

island is wholly on one side of the filum aquae, it belongs

(I)
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to the proprietor on whose side it forms.

If the island

forms partly on each side, then the filum aquae will divide
the ownership.

Islands thus formed will change the positin

of the thread of the stream again, and each side of the island will form in its turn a shore line which will throw
between
the thread of the stream midway itself and the shore which
it faces.

There will thus be two rivers, &aid islands which

might arise in either would be divided between the proprietors of the island first formed and the original shore
according to

analogous principles. Thus, if the island is

altogether on one side of the thread of the stream, between
the first island and the main shore, it will belong to the
owner of the main shore or of the island, according as it
is nearer the one or the other.

If a river suddenly leaves

it bed or becomes dry, title to the soil will remain unchan
ged. (I) Thus it is that grants of land bordering on the
shore of a stream not navigable, include all islands, or
parts of islands, between the shore and the center of
the

stream, unless clearly reserved from the operation

of the grant.

(I)
(2)

(2)

Woodbury v. Short, 17 Vt. 387.
Solp v. Hoyt, 44111 . 223,

